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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES WEIGHT-LOSS PLAN:
JUST How MANDATORY ARE THE
"ADVISORY"GUIDELINES AFTER
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER?
INTRODUCTION
Judge Hovland of the U.S. District Court for North Dakota re-
cently observed that
The present ongoing debate throughout the country concerns
the weight to be afforded the Sentencing Guidelines .... For
example, in the District of Utah, Judge Cassell has adopted
the view that the Sentencing Guidelines should be given
"heavy weight" or "considerable weight" and should be fol-
lowed in all but "the most unusual cases."..... Judge Kopf [of
the District of Nebraska] expressed the opinion that the
Guidelines must be given "substantial weight." On the other
hand, Judge Adelman in the Eastern District of Wisconsin
held that the ... Guidelines are "just one of a number of sen-
tencing factors" to be considered.'
These judges are not contemplating weight classes in boxing or the
latest trends in bariatric surgery, but rather the effects of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Booker.2 In a much antici-
pated holding, the Court declared that the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines ("Guidelines"), as written, violated a criminal defendant's Sixth
I United States v. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020(D.N.D. Feb. 15, 2005) (citations
omitted).
2 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For more about bariatric weight loss surgery, see Tracy Connor,
"Celebrities Put Fat-Fighting Gastric Surgery in the Spotlight," N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 18,
2002, at 10; Milt Freudenheim, "Hospitals Pressured by Soaring Demand for Obesity Surgery,"
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at A6.
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Amendment right to trial by jury. But rather than requiring that the
Court's reiterated Sixth Amendment standard be attached to the
Guidelines, a different majority, led by Justice Breyer and joined only
by Justice Ginsburg from the merits opinion, rendered the Guidelines
"effectively advisory.",3  This is not to say, however, that federal
courts have regained much of the discretion they lost when Congress
proclaimed the beginning of the Guidelines era two decades ago.4 A
closer reading of Justice Breyer's remedy indicates that federal courts
are still required to consider the Guidelines along with other factors
when sentencing offenders.5
A disparity has quickly developed among the various District
Courts and Courts of Appeals over just how much weight should be
given the now-advisory Guidelines. One view holds that the Guide-
lines are still the dominant factor in the federal sentencing scheme,
and that sentencing judges should only stray from their suggested6
punishment ranges only in rare circumstances. The other school of
thought sees the Guidelines as a much less significant concern com-
pared to other factors listed in the Federal Sentencing Act that survive
Booker.
7
This Comment advocates that the less restrictive reading of the
Guidelines should be followed. Part I explains Booker, in which the
Supreme Court held that while mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
violate the Sixth Amendment, advisory Guidelines are not only per-
missible but required in future sentencing cases. Part II examines the
history of federal sentencing practice and the development and reform
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Part III reviews the case law underly-
ing the Court's Booker decision, focusing particularly on Apprendi v.
New Jersey8 and Blakely v. Washington,9 which form the substance of
Booker's constitutional analysis. Part IV analyzes how courts have
begun to apply the Guidelines after Booker.
3 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Souter and Ginsburg com-
prised the merits majority, while Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist made up the remedial majority.
4 The Guidelines have been in use since 1987, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 cre-
ated the United States Sentencing Commission and authorized the Commission to promulgate
these rules. Discussed infra at Part H1.
5 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005).
6 See, e.g., United States. v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah Feb. 2, 2005), dis-
cussed infra at Part IV.
7 See, e.g., United States. v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2005), discussed infra
at Part IV.
9 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
9 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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I. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: MANDATING THE CONSULTATION OF
ADVISORY GUIDELINES
Booker is in many ways two cases in one. The Supreme Court
chose to consolidate the defendant Booker's appeal of his upward
departure sentence with the government's appeal of the defendant
Fanfan's downward departure sentence.' 0 Two entirely different ma-jorities, of which Justice Ginsburg was the only member of the court
to join both opinions, outlined the constitutionality and remedy of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. And the court in one opinion man-
aged to declare the Guidelines invalid and yet still require the use of
the rules in their amended advisory form. These fundamental divi-
sions make Booker a prime case for extended debate that lower courts
and litigants now must decipher its impact.
A. United States v. Booker: Case Background
Freddie Booker, a drug dealer from Wisconsin, became the name-
sake of this decision after his conviction for crack cocaine posses-
sion. 1 Booker and a customer were arrested at a third party's house
for criminal trespass.12 A search incident to Booker's arrest produced
a duffel bag belonging to Booker, which contained 92.5 grams of
crack cocaine. 13 Booker admitted to the police that he sold an addi-
tional 566 grams of crack cocaine, although this statement was not the
basis of the jury's decision.14 At trial in the District Court for West-
ern District of Wisconsin, Booker was convicted on crack cocaine
possession charges.' 5
10 Was it appropriate to only use drug offenses for these appeals? See generally Brief of
Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al., Bijou v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1022 (2004) (Nos. 04-5272, 04-105, 04-104) (proposing that a case involving a
firearms offense should be substituted for Fanfan's appeal). One commentator argued that drug
offenses are so unique that the Guidelines should not be assessed solely on the basis of drug
cases. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is
Uniformity, not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 833, 852 (1992).
1 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. Booker was officially charged with possession with intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base, an offense outlined at 21 U.S.C. § 814(a)(1).
United States v. Edwards points out that Booker held cocaine base and crack cocaine to be
definitionally the same substance. 397 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Congress
intended a difference between cocaine and crack cocaine/cocaine base in the statutory penal-
ties).
12 Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court at 2, Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005) (No. 04-104), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004_
104.pet.aa.pdf.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Specifically, Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than 50
grams of cocaine base, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). Id.
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The jury at Booker's trial based his conviction on evidence that
Booker possessed 92.5 grams of crack cocaine.' 6  Factoring in
Booker's criminal history, the Guidelines mandated a sentence of
between 210 and 262 months in prison.' 7 The judge nonetheless held
an additional sentencing hearing, finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that Booker was responsible for the additional 566 grams of
crack cocaine and had obstructed justice at his trial.' 8 These new
findings produced a sentencing range of 360 months to life impris-
onment.' 9 The judge sentenced Booker at the bottom of this new
range, but the resulting 30 year sentence was an upward departure of
almost a decade more of prison time compared to the initial range
provided by the Guidelines.2°
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that this
extended sentence violated the holdings of Apprendi v. New Jersey
and Blakely v. Washington.2' The majority interpreted those deci-
sions to require a sentence within the original range, and that the trial
judge's additional findings regarding evidence and obstruction of
justice should have been submitted to a jury.22 The Guidelines
impermissibly required judicial factfinding in violation of the Ap-
prendi/Blakely requirement that such findings be submitted to a jury.
While Judge Posner admitted that sentencing judges would always be
allowed some discretion, he noted that "there is a difference between
allowing [informal discretion] ... and commanding [a judge] to make
factfindings.... ,23
Holding that Booker was entitled to have a jury find the facts un-
derlying the sentence enhancement by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, even if an additional jury was needed, Posner stated, "[t]here is
no novelty in a separate jury trial with regard to the sentence, just as
there is no novelty in a bifurcated jury trial" for determining liability
and damages.24
16 Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746.
17 Id. at 746. See 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4AlI (2005).
18 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004). Apprendi and Blakely are dis-
cussed infra at Part 11I.
22 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
23 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2004).
24 Id. at 514. Posner also noted that separate juries were a feature of capital cases, first
finding the defendant's guilt or innocence before deciding whether to recommend a death sen-
tence. Id. The Supreme Court has separately addressed the jury trial requirement as applied to
capital punishment cases. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (invalidating Arizona's
death sentencing requirement of judicially-found aggravating factor); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990).
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Judge Easterbrook dissented from the Seventh Circuit's decision,
claiming that a Circuit Court was not empowered to extend Blakely
and find the Guidelines unconstitutional.2 5 Arguing that cases de-
fending the Guidelines survived Blakely, Judge Easterbrook pointed
out that "[j]ust as opera stars often go on singing after being shot,
stabbed, or poisoned, so [to do] judicial opinions often survive what
could be fatal blows. 26 One might think of the Federal Guidelines in
a similar light; despite being unconstitutional when they were manda-
tory, the Guidelines nonetheless survive even a significant impact.
B. United States v. Fanfan: Case Background
Duncan Fanfan, meanwhile, was participating in a cocaine con-
spiracy in Maine. He was arrested after an ongoing narcotics investi-
gation caught one of his co-conspirators. 27 Incident to the arrest, nar-
cotics agents found 1.25 kilograms of powder cocaine and 281.6
grams of crack cocaine in Fanfan's vehicle. 28 At trial in the Maine
District Court, the jury found affirmatively that Fanfan had 500 or
more grams of cocaine in his possession, and he was convicted of
conspiracy and drug possession charges.29
The jury's finding alone would have supported a maximum 78
month sentence under the Guidelines, but Blakely v. Washington
caused the trial judge to reconsider. 30 In a sentencing hearing only a
few days after Blakely, the trial judge found by a preponderance of
evidence that Fanfan had possessed 2.5 kilograms of powder cocaine,
261.6 grams of crack cocaine, and had held an organizing role in the
criminal conspiracy.31 Once the judge calculated what Fanfan's sen-
tence would be under the Guidelines, his findings regarding drug
quantity and criminal history would have added an additional 10
years to Fanfan's sentence.32
The judge declined to make the upward departure, reasoning that
in light of Blakely-and despite Blakely's explicit statement that it
expressed no opinion on the validity of the Federal
Guidelines-imposing the higher sentence would violate Fanfan's
25 Booker, 375 F.3d at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
26 Id.
27 Petition for writ of certiorari, United States v. Fanfan (2004) (No. 04-105).
28 Id.
29 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. Specifically, Fanfan was charged with conspiracy to distrib-
ute and possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(l)(B)(ii).
30 See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
31 Id.
32 Fanfan faced an enhanced sentence of 15-16 years instead of the initial 5-6 years. Id.
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right to have these facts found by a jury.3 3 Claiming that his decision
was constrained by Blakely, the judge explained, "perhaps the Su-
preme Court can find a way to explain away Blakely in its language
and its reasoning, but... I cannot .... I will leave it to higher courts
to tell me it does not mean exactly what it says."34 Fanfan was in-
stead sentenced within the original Guidelines range. After the prose-
cution appealed the downward departure directly to the Supreme
Court, the Court did exactly as Fanfan's trial judge had requested and
explained Blakely.
C. United States v. Booker at the Supreme Court
1. Constitutionality
Justice Stevens delivered the Court's substantive opinion, finding
the Guidelines unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment's jury
trial requirement. Basing his analysis on the principle that criminal
defendants may only be convicted "upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [they
are] charged, ' 35 and those defendants' "right to demand that a jury
find [them] guilty of all the elements of the crime with which [they]
are charged,, 36 Stevens examined the Guidelines and how they have
been interpreted by the Court's most recent decisions.
The sticking point for the merits majority was the mandatory na-
ture of the Guidelines, which rendered them functionally equivalent
to the state guidelines the Court had just struck down in Blakely. Ste-
vens noted that if the Guidelines were suggestions for judges to fol-
low, rather than requirements, the constitutionality question would be
moot. "[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a spe-
cific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a
jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.
37
Stevens also discounted the proposal that the statutory language al-
lowing "departures in specific, limited cases"' 38 was a solution to the
Sixth Amendment violation. Stevens wrote, "[t]he availability of a
departure in specified circumstances does not avoid the constitutional
issue ... departures are not available in every case, and in fact are
33 Id.; United States. v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *2 (D. Me. 2004).
34 Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5.
35 125 S. Ct. 738, 748 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
36 Id. at 748 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995)).
37 125 S. Ct. at 750.
38 Id.
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unavailable in most." 39 When the Sentencing Commission had con-
sidered all relevant factors, a departure was impermissible.4°
The departure in Booker's case was a manifestation of this prob-
lem. Stevens viewed this severe upward departure in a "run-of-the-
mill drug case" as one that could only have been supported by addi-
tional fact finding after the jury verdict-a clear violation of Booker's
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on all elements of the crime for
which he had been convicted.4'
2. Severability Analysis
The Court considered two possibilities for bringing the Guidelines
into compliance with the Sixth Amendment: it could either attach the
jury factfinding requirement embodied in the Apprendi rule to the
Guidelines, or strike statutory references in the Federal Sentencing
Act that made the Guidelines mandatory. To determine whether it
could remove two sections of the statute that violated the Sixth
Amendment, rendering the Guidelines "effectively advisory," the
Court engaged in a severability analysis. 42
Generally, courts will be able to sever provisions that they view as
ancillary to the general purpose of the statute, leaving the remaining
statute to function independently. 43 But if the questioned provision is
central to the statute, the court will be less inclined to remove it.4
Unlike a contract, the court cannot rewrite a statute as it sees fit, nor
can it disregard otherwise valid statutes because of minor constitu-
tional violations.45 However, the court can excise portions of the
statute to achieve constitutionality.46 While the judiciary will look for
evidence of legislative intent, this may be a frustrating exercise as the
statute's complexity grows.4 7
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 751.
42 Id. at 757.
43 Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 41, 44
(1995).
44Id.
45 Id. at 57-58.
46 Id. at 58-59.
47 Id. at 73; Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41
HARv. J. LEGIS. 227, 230 (2004). Note that the Court treats the absence of these clauses as mere
silence that does not create either presumption. Id. at 238, 242-43. See also Stephen Breyer, On
the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 856-61 (1991).Query whether congressional intent may just as well have been ascertained by examining the
amicus brief submitted by Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein. See generally Brief of
Amici Curiae for the Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, et al., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738
(2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105).
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In Booker, the Court relied heavily on Alaska Airlines v. Brock 48 to
justify its severability analysis. 49 The Court in Alaska Airlines eluci-
dated a preference for severing unconstitutional provisions rather than
invalidating entire statutes; this kept more with legislative intent than
outright nullification.50  A unanimous Court held in that case that
unless Congress would not have enacted the statute without the in-
validated provision(s), "the invalid part may be dropped if what is left
is fully operative as a law.",51 However, "[a] court should refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary" and preserve the
valid sections of the statute under review.52 The Court will look to
the language and structure of the challenged Act of Congress, as well
as legislative history, to determine intent5 3
3. The Guidelines Remedy
What makes Booker an unusual decision is that four of the justices
who declared the Guidelines in violation of the Sixth Amendment
dissented from the majority's approved remedy. Justice Breyer, who
dissented from the substantive portion of the opinion, and has argua-
bly the most expertise on sentencing of all the Justices, chose to
amend the Guidelines by removing two statutory provisions that made
the sentencing rules mandatory.54 One stricken provision stated that
trial courts "shall impose" sentences within the Guidelines range.5
Its companion granted automatic appeals of departures from the
Guidelines under a de novo review standard.56
After conducting a severability analysis, the remedial majority re-
jected the merits majority's proposal to "engraft the [jury trial] re-
quirement onto the sentencing statutes,' 57 deciding that preserving the
Guidelines as advisory would remain more true to original legislative
intent5 8 Since the jury trial requirement would reach every aspect of
48 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
49 Alaska Airlines involved a challenge to employee protection laws resulting from airline
deregulation.
50 Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
51 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam)).
52 Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
53 Id. at 687.
54 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757. Breyer was a member of the Sentencing Commission from
1985 to 1989. Stephen Breyer, Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14
CRIM. JUST. 28 (1999) [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines Revisited]. Breyer was also the chief
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee during its 1970s sentencing reform efforts. Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Transforms Use of Sentence Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2005, at A4.
55 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
56 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2005).
57 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 760.
58 Id. at 757.
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indictment, plea bargaining and trial, Breyer explained, "we must
determine likely intent not by counting [affected] proceedings, but by
evaluating the consequences of the [jury trial] requirement in light of
the [Sentencing Reform] Act's language, its history, and its basic
purposes. 59
The remedial majority argued that adding the jury trial language
advocated by Stevens's dissent would require an unrealistic definition
of "court" as implying "the judge working together with the jury," a
case of semantics that "would be 'plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress."' 60 Relying on the statutory goals underlying the Guide-
lines, Breyer wrote:
To engraft the Court's constitutional requirement onto the
sentencing statutes . . . would destroy the system. It would
prevent a judge from relying upon a presentence report for
[relevant] factual information . . . uncovered after the
trial ... [It would] weaken the tie between a sentence and an
offender's real conduct. It would thereby undermine the sen-
tencing statute's basic aim of ensuring similar sentences for
those who have committed similar crimes in similar ways.61
Breyer envisioned numerous hypothetical situations that the justice
system would want to avoid: for instance, requiring prosecutors to
charge every element of every potential crime in the indictment, forc-
ing defendants to take contradictory positions to these elements in
plea bargaining, and removing trial conduct like contempt or obstruc-
tion of justice entirely from the sentencing consideration.62 With
some alarm, Breyer noted that "in a sentencing system with the
Court's constitutional requirement engrafted onto it, any factor that a
prosecutor chose not to charge at the plea negotiation would be placed
beyond the reach of the judge entirely. '63 These results would seem
to underscore how amending the Guidelines in this way would have
gone further astray from Congress' desire to achieve sentencing uni-
formity.
Defending the removal of the mandatory language, Breyer wrote
that even absent these provisions, "the [Federal Sentencing] Act
nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together
with other sentencing goals." 64 Despite removing the restrictive stan-
59 Id. at 758.
60 Id. at 759 (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 759-60.
62 See id. at 762-63.
63 Id. at 763.
61 Id. at 764.
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dard of review with the appeals clause, the statute still functions "be-
cause ... a statute that does not explicitly set forth a standard of re-
view may nonetheless do so implicitly. '65 Breyer read the history of
the Guidelines to imply a standard of unreasonableness on appellate
review; this was, in fact, the Federal Sentencing Act's standard until
replaced with de novo review in 2003.66
Courts in the first month following Booker have already widely
disagreed on the interpretation of the new requirement that they con-
sult the now-advisory Guidelines.67 Anticipating this uncertainty, and
potential backlash from the legislative branch, Justice Breyer stated:
"[o]urs, or course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress'
court. [Congress] is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the
sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that [it] judges
,,68best for the federal system of justice.
4. Internal Disagreement over Booker
That the Supreme Court was hardly in agreement over the holdings
resulting from Booker would be a substantial understatement. Justice
Stevens strongly opposed the remedy chosen by the dissenters to his
merits opinion, describing severability as an "extraordinary" remedy
chosen for what he viewed as a problem of limited impact.69 Stevens
argued that the court selectively applied the doctrine to invalidate the
Guidelines based on "the Court's reading of 'likely' legislative in-
tent.
,70
By contrast, the remedial majority71 disagreed with the application
of the Apprendi rule, preferring to allow the traditional role of judicial
factfinding prior to sentencing. Breyer's long-held approach was that
the Guidelines address sentencing facts, rather than elements of a
crime.72 Breyer disagreed with the originalist view of sentencing,
65 Id. at 765 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-560 (1988)).
66 De novo review for Guidelines sentences resulted from amendments to the PROTECT
Act in 2003. Id. at 765. See infra at Part I for discussion of the PROTECT Act.
67 Discussed infra at Part IV.
68 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
69 Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens challenged Breyer's claim that the costs of
administering justice under a system where the Apprendi jury trial requirement was tied to
mandatory Guidelines sentencing would be staggering. Stevens wrote, "[t]his may not be the
most efficient system imaginable, but the Constitution does not permit efficiency to be our
primary concern." Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Excepting, of course, Justice Ginsburg.
72 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 2531, 2551-62 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569-
72 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 555-56 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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writing that "[the Court] cannot look to the Framers for support, for
they, too, enacted criminal statutes with indeterminate sentences, re-
vealing their own understanding and acceptance of the judge's fact-
finding role at sentencing. 73
Justice Scalia was quite alarmed at the remedial majority's inter-
pretation of legislative intent and its decision to create a new standard
of review after excising the appeals clause.74 Scalia described the
remedy as "wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a
statutory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it
discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sentencing., 75
The resulting void left by the removal of the de novo standard of re-
view was unnecessary, he reasoned, since it was illogical to discard
an express standard in favor of an implied unreasonableness test.
Scalia rhetorically asked: "when the Court has severed [the explicit]
standard of review ... does it make any sense to look for some con-
gressional 'implication' of a different standard of review in the rem-
nants of the statute that the Court has left standing? Only in Wonder-
land. 76
As if the Booker opinions weren't already convoluted, Justice
Thomas not only dissented from Breyer's remedy, but disagreed with
Stevens' dissent.77 Simultaneously criticizing the removal of the
mandatory language as overly narrow and overly broad,78 Thomas
believed that "nothing except the Guidelines as written will function
in a manner perfectly consistent with the intent of Congress, and the
Guidelines as written are unconstitutional in some applications. 79
D. The Fate of Booker, Fanfan and the Guidelines
Amid all the discussion over the Sixth Amendment jury trial re-
quirement and how to reform the Guidelines into compliance, one
73 ld. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
74 Justice Scalia would certainly be alarmed by Breyer's criticism of the Framers in the
prior paragraph as well. See text accompanying supra note 76.
75 Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 793. Justice O'Connor may think Wonderland is little more than, 'Apprendi-land.'
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Then
again, many Scalia opponents may argue that his notorious use of originalist construction is
more appropriate for Wonderland than Washington, D.C. C.f LEWIS CARROLL, THE
ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (Martin
Gardner, ed., Norton 2000)(1865). See also Denise Taylor, A Day at Revere Beach, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 15, 2002, at 11 (illustrating the history of the Wonderland Entertainment Complex
in Boston).
77 Query whether dissenting from a dissent happens frequently in Wonderland. Or even in
Apprendi-land. See supra note 76.
78 Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 796 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 802 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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may wonder what happened to Booker and Fanfan. Neither one will
be walking the streets any time soon as a result of the Court's hold-
ings. Since Booker's sentence was a steep upward departure, the
Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's decision to vacate the sentence
and remand the case for resentencing. But since Booker's previous
sentencing range was between 10-20 years, this decision probably
only spared him a third decade of incarceration. Fanfan, meanwhile,
was sentenced below the Guidelines range. The Court noted that
since the lower range was supported by the jury's finding, Fanfan's
sentence did not implicate the Apprendi rule. Still, the court vacated
this sentence to allow the government-or Fanfan, in the unlikely
event he would seek a higher sentence-to pursue resentencing. 80
As for the Guidelines, the Booker remedy directed judges to con-
tinue using the Guidelines for sentencing advice and factfinding for
.adjustment factors is expected to continue. The controlling rule, per
Apprendi, is that facts underlying these adjustments must be found by
a jury under the reasonable doubt standard. But how freely may sen-
tencing courts disregard the Guidelines in favor of other sentencing
concerns?
II. FEDERAL SENTENCING REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
MANDATORY GUIDELINES
The Booker decision could be viewed as the Supreme Court's en-
dorsement of the belief that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
due for a major reassessment two decades after their conception. One
view is that the guidelines were a failed experiment, and Booker's
merits decision points the judicial system back toward the days of
largely "unfettered [judicial] discretion." 8' Observers taking a con-
trary position contend that the Guidelines will remain as the primary
reference point for district judges to institute Congress' sentencing
objectives.82  The definitive answer to the problems Booker creates
will have to come from Congress, especially now that Justice Breyer
and the Court have passed the bail to the legislative branch.83 In the
interim, practitioners, members of the judiciary and academic com-
80 Id. at 769.
81 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. See Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing
Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775, 786 (2002) (arguing that restricting
judicial discretion indicates the Guidelines have failed); see also Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of
Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum
Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 185, 186 (1993).
82 See United States v. Wilson, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005), discussed infra at
Part V.
83 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at, 768.
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mentators need to understand the history of federal sentencing rules in
order to best proceed.
A. Sentencing Practice Leading to the Creation of the Sentencing
Commission
While Congress has the constitutional authority to define crimes
and punishments, it traditionally delegated that power to the trial
judge, who was given discretion to interpret wide sentencing ranges. 84
Federal criminal trials featured indeterminate sentencing; that is,
judges imposed an indefinite sentencing period and prisoners were
released only after the approval of a federal parole board. 85 But this
system produced a number of undesirable results, including sentences
shortened by early parole, participants in identical crimes receiving
radically different sentences, and, most important, sentences based on
illegitimate or random factors such as race, gender or geography.86
As Justice Breyer phrased it, "[t]he length of time a person spent in
prison appeared to depend on 'what the judge ate for breakfast' on the
1,87day of the sentencing....
Congress occasionally intervened with efforts like mandatory
minimum sentences or increased statutory maximums, 88 but sentenc-
ing reform did not move toward the Guidelines model until the
1970s.89  While Congress attempted to move judicial sentencing
power to the U.S. Parole Commission,90 and progressively more re-
strictive models for advisory Sentencing Guidelines surfaced, these
efforts were largely unsuccessful. 9' In assessing these reforms, it was
clear that Congress had rejected parole-based rehabilitation as a
workable system, describing it as an "outmoded... model ... [with]
'unjustifi[ed] and 'shameful' consequences." 92
84 Hatch, supra note 81 at 186.
85 Blakcly, 124 S. Ct. at 2553-54, (Breyer, J., dissenting); Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783, (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
86 See Brief of Amici Curiae Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, et al. United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105). The Sentencing Commission estimated that under indetermi-
nate sentencing, offenders were serving on average only 58% of their imposed sentences.
United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing at iv (2004)
[hereinafter USSC Report], available at http://www.ussc.gov/1 5-year/l 5year.htm.
87 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88 Hatch, supra note 90 at 186.
89 Senator Edward Kennedy is credited with the first legislative proposal for Guidelines-
style sentencing reform. Interestingly enough, he appeared in an amicus brief on behalf on
Congress in Booker. USSC Report, supra note 86, at 3.
90 Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 161, 186 (1991).
91 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (citations omitted).
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Once Congress moved toward the idea of mandatory guidelines,
the measure passed overwhelmingly in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (hereinafter "SRA"). 93 The SRA created an independent entity
in the judicial branch, the United States Sentencing Commission
(hereinafter "Sentencing Commission"), to draft the sentencing regu-
lations.94 Implementing the Guidelines was not a simple task, as the
Sentencing Commission needed three years and a Supreme Court
decision upholding its authority before the Guidelines were insti-
tuted.95 The Sentencing Commission's task was not finished with the
release of the initial Guidelines; it was given the authority to review
the Guidelines and institute new rules.
96
The SRA also enacted a number of provisions that drastically re-
shaped federal sentencing practices. Congress abolished the parole
system, allowing sentences to be later modified only for "extraordi-
nary and compelling reasons. 97 In place of indeterminate sentencing,
courts were ordered to abide by the Guidelines range unless they
found a factor the Sentencing Commission had overlooked. 98 Other
relevant considerations imposed by the statute included the nature of
the offense and the defendant, deterrence, just punishment, policy
considerations promulgated by the Commission, and the avoidance of
unwarranted sentencing disparities. 99  Using an unreasonableness
standard, appeals were originally allowed for sentences imposed due
to misapplication of the Guidelines or as an upward departure from
the Guidelines maximum.1 00
93 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sentencing Commission was organized as a
bipartisan body, and originally was to include three federal judges in its membership. Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States Sentencing Commission at *4-*5, United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105); 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005).
95 See generally Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361. Mistretta upheld the Sentencing Commis-
sion's authority as a permissible delegation of legislative power, despite its placement in the
judicial branch.
96 Congress retained some oversight over new rles, having 180 days to disapprove of or
modify them. 28 U.S.C. § 991(o) (2005). Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Sentencing
Commission at 10, United States v. Booker, 124 S. Ct. 738 (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105). 28
U.S.C. § 994(p) (2005). Congress intended that the Commission would revise the Guidelines as
new statistical data showed their effects. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1988)
[hereinafter Guidelines Compromises].
97 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2005).
98 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2005).
9 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(l)-(6) (2005). These goals are not easy to reconcile; the SRA di-
rected the Commission to "provide certainty and fairness," to "avoid... unwarranted sentencing
disparities," among similarly situated defendants, "while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences... 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b)(l)(B) (2005).
1- 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742 (a)(1)-(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (2005).
[Vol. 55:41110
2005] FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WEIGHT-LOSS PLAN 1111
Justice Stevens believed it essential that Congress had rejected dis-
cretionary sentencing in its 1984 debates.'0 ' Stevens observed, "the
notion that Congress had any confidence that judges would reduce
sentencing disparities by considering relevant conduct ... either ig-
nores or misreads the political environment in which the SRA
passed."'0
2
B. A Brief How-To Guide to the Guidelines
Application of the Guidelines is a step by step process that is de-
signed to include individualized adjustments. °3  Beginning with a
base level offense of conviction, judges are directed to make upward
and downward adjustments to the applicable sentencing range de-
pending on certain factors such as the defendant's role, acceptance of
responsibility and criminal history. 14 In order for judges to more
easily apply the adjustments, the Guidelines' drafters included a
number of hypotheticals which were meant to illustrate what should
happen under particular circumstances. 10 5 As long as the judges make
written justification, the Guidelines provide for departures based on
factors like the defendant's character.10 6
Criminal history considerations can quickly result in a sizable up-
ward adjustment. 0 7 Similarly, the Guidelines' reliance on drug quan-
tity can produce a sentence much higher than the offender's compara-
tive culpability. 10 8 This can exacerbate sentencing disparities; as Jus-
tice Breyer argued, "sentencing proportionality [is] a key element of
sentencing fairness that demands that the law punish a drug 'kingpin'
and a 'mule' differently."'09
lot Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 785-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 2 Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 See Guidelines Compromises, supra note 96, at 6-7 (explaining the mechanics of the
seven-step Guidelines application process).
104 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 1Bl.l(c), (d), (e), (f), (i) (2005). The Guidelines ranges were de-
signed to have a 25% range; the maximum was not to exceed the minimum by the greater of six
months or 25% of the minimum. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 218 (1992)
(White, J., dissenting).
1°5 See generally commentary to 18 U.S.C. Appx. § I B1.2 (2005); the drafters were clear
about what they expect to happen if a judge deviates from these hypotheticals, stating that
failure to abide by the commentary would subject a sentence to appellate reversal. 18 U.S.C.
Appx. § 1B1.7 (2005).
106 18 U.S.C. Appx. § IB1.4 (2005).
107 See 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 4A1.I (2005).
'
01 See generally 18 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 2D1.1 - 2D1.13 (2005) (this series lists the quantity
tables for drug offenses). See also United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30-PS, slip op. at 9
(N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.innd.uscourts.gov/opinions/Simon/204cr3OUSAvNellum.pdf ("The government is
well aware that for every controlled buy that is made, the quantity of drugs is increased, and so
is the sentence ... ").
109 United States. v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545, 570-71 (Breyer, J., concurring); USSC Report,
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The most frequently used device to deviate from a Guidelines sen-
tence may be a downward departure for providing substantial assis-
tance to authorities. Once the government makes a motion that the
defendant provided assistance "in the investigation or prosecution of
another [offender]," a downward departure is justified. ° The court
then has wide discretion to decide how far to depart from the sentence
range."' 1 Given the frequency of substantial assistance departures,
some have argued that they are a way for the litigants and judge to
manipulate the Guidelines as they find expedient.' 1 2 While numerous
grounds exist for both types of departures, upward departures are far
easier to justify.113
C. Practical Effects of the Guidelines
Given the nature of the crimes they address and the sweeping
changes they represent-, the Guidelines began as a system of compro-
mises and have drawn controversy throughout their existence.'1 4 But
the results produced by the Guidelines are not exactly what the SRA
intended. Although numerous Supreme Court decisions have ad-
dressed the Guidelines' application relating to jury trials," 5 over 97%
of federal cases are resolved through plea bargaining." 1
6
Plea bargaining is seen by the Sentencing Commission as a sort of
necessary evil and there is not much disparity in its use nationwide.'
17
A Sentencing Commission retrospective on the Guidelines lamented
supra note 86, at 50.
110 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 5K1.1 (2005).
11 Heaney, supra note 86, at 198.
112 Hatch, supra note 81, at 190. Senator Hatch refers to this practice as "hidden bargain-
ing." Cf. 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 5K2.0, comment 5 (2005) (stating that frequent departures lead to
the very unwarranted disparities the Guidelines were supposed to avoid). Since the severity of
drug crimes is so much higher compared to other Guidelines offenses, there have been accusa-
tions of collusion between the adversaries and the judge to avoid these very high minimums.
Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 853.
113 For upward departures, the court may consider death, 18 U.S.C. Appx. § 5K2.1 (2005),
physical injury, § 5K2.2, or extreme psychological injury, § 5K2.3, caused in the crime, abduc-
tion, § 5K2.4, property damage, § 5K2.5, weapons use, § 5K2.6, "extreme conduct," § 5K2.8,
gang involvement, § 5K2.18, or uncharged conduct, § 5K2.21; a downward departure may be
grounded upon the victim's conduct, § 5K2.10, coercion and duress, § 5K2.12, diminished
mental capacity,§ 5K2.13, or that the offense was an aberration by a defendant not disposed to
recidivism.
114 Guidelines Compromises, supra note 96, at 9.
115 Discussed infra at Part III.
116 Petition for writ of certiorari, United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2004) (No. 04-
104); Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). United States Sentencing Commission
Federal Sentencing Statistics (First Circuit) at 3 (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov./judpack/jp2002/lc02.pdf; [hereinafter Federal Sentencing Statistics].
117 Plea rates range from 94.8% in the District of Columbia Circuit to 98.3% in the Ninth
Circuit. Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 116, at 3-5.
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that although plea bargaining can undermine uniform sentencing,
"defendants ... need some incentive to plead guilty if trial rates [are]
to be kept within manageable limits. ' ' 1" Plea bargaining helps to ease
an already burdened justice system, and the Sentencing Commission
admits that the Guidelines contributed to record incarceration rates. 119
Drug offenses have become a centerpiece of the Guidelines-it is
no statistical fluke that both offenders in Booker were charged with
drug crimes-and Congress has responded by repeatedly increasing
mandatory minimum sentences for these offenses. 2  In drug sentenc-
ing, the use of probation has been virtually eliminated since the
Guidelines became effective.' 2' The resulting incarceration rates ac-
tually prompted Congress to enact a "safety valve" in 1994 to waive
mandatory penalties for first-time nonviolent offenders. 1
22
Incarceration rates have demonstrated that instead of reducing ra-
cial sentencing disparities as the Sentencing Commission hoped, this
gap has widened greatly. 23  It is evident that the Guidelines system
had to absorb an increasing number of recidivist offenders. 124  Re-
gional disparities also continue to pervade the system, with an exag-
gerated difference in Guidelines departure rates at the District Court
level. 125
18 USSC Report, supra note 86, at 29.
119 id. at 40.
120 Nationally, drug-related crimes accounted for 40.5% of the sentencing workload in
2002. Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 116, at 1. These percentages were even higher
regionally, with 52.7% of First Circuit sentences and 48.4% of Eleventh Circuit sentences
involving drug offenses. These disparities may be explained by the sheer volume of trafficking
cases arising in Puerto Rico and Florida, both major importation sources from Central and South
America. See id. at 1; United States Sentencing Commission Federal Sentencing Statistics
(Eleventh Circuit) at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/jp2002/1lc02.pdf.
Justice Breyer has been a harsh critic of mandatory minimums, arguing that "they transfer
sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide
to bring ... [and] that they encourage subterfuge . . . thereby making them a comparatively
ineffective means of guaranteeing tough sentences." Harris, 536 U.S. at 570-71 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
121 USSC Report, supra note 86, at 52.
122 Id. at 51. While 82.3% of defendants sentenced in 2002 received prison terms, incar-
ceration rates for the three most frequent offenses far exceeded the national average, as 89.1%
of firearms offenders, 93.5% of drug traffickers, and 95.5% of immigrations violators received
prison sentences. See Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note 116, at 7. Quantity-based sen-
tencing has also been attacked as unreliable because the quantity of drugs involved in routine
transactions has continued to increase. Under the so-called 100-1 ratio, 100 grams of powder
cocaine would receive the same penalty as 1 gram of crack cocaine. See id. at 131-32; Schul-
hofer, supra note 10, at 854.
213 USSC Report, supra note 86, at 115.
124 Breyer noted that in FY 1996, 20.3% of all federal cases involved offenders whose
criminal histories were in the three most severe classes, and 44.2% of drug cases featured of-
fenders with past offenses. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998).
125 According to the Sentencing Commission's data, 65% of defendants in 2002 were
sentenced within the prescribed Guidelines range. Federal Sentencing Statistics, supra note
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D. Subsequent Guidelines Reforms
Congress and the Sentencing Commission have been true to their
pledge to update the Guidelines, although the result has been to
gradually restrict judges' ability to make departures. 126 Much of this
reform has been directed toward drug, firearms and sex offenses, es-
pecially with stricter mandatory minimums, focused toward marginal
participants. 27  At the very least, the Sentencing Commission has
been prolific, more than doubling the Guidelines manual in length
since the inaugural version.
28
The arguably most notorious of the changes applied to the Guide-
lines came in 2003 with the PROTECT Act. 129  While the Act was
designed to expand prosecutorial powers in crimes against children, a
last minute, and barely noticed, amendment restricted available depar-
tures to the upward-slanted list already enumerated in the Guidelines
and more importantly altered the standard of appellate review in the
Guidelines. 30 Whereas the original SRA had provided review for the
116, at 11. By contrast, 17.4% received downward departures for substantial assistance, 16.8%
received other downward departures, and a mere 0.8% were given upward departures; as Booker
received such an upward departure, he was clearly in the national minority. id. There remains
wide divergence in these rates by both Circuit and District grouping. At the low end of the
spectrum for Guidelines compliance were the Second Circuit (61.3% sentenced within Guide-
lines range), the Third Circuit (58.9%) and the Ninth Circuit (48.8%). By contrast, The First
(75.7% - mostly due to Puerto Rico), Fourth (76.6%), Fifth (71%) and Eleventh (70.2%) Cir-
cuits had much better Id. at 11-13. At the district level, the geographic disparity is even more
apparent; while the busy districts of Arizona and Southern California sentenced their defendants
within the Guidelines 30.9% and 37.4% of the time, respectively, the Eastern Virginia and
Southern Florida districts, with comparable caseloads, returned 89.9% and 80.7% compliance
rates. Id. Cf Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 857 (noting that departures are especially con-
strained in drug offenses, since upward adjustments are given a comparative free reign while
downward departures are restricted).
126 Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 USSC Report, supra note 86, at 3.
128 The Sentencing Amendment had made 662 amendments as of its 2003 edition of the
Guidelines. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Sentencing Commission at * 10, United States
v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105). See Sentencing Guidelines Revisited,
supra note 54, at 34; Frank 0. Bowman III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing
System Be Saved? A Plea For Rapid Reversal ofBlakely v. Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
217, 260 n.159 (2004) (stating that the Guidelines grew from 201 pages to 491 pages as of the
2003 edition). Of course, the Guidelines encompass nearly 700 crimes, so a voluminous struc-
ture should not be all that surprising. Guidelines Compromises, supra note 106, at 3; see also
Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, supra note 54, at 29.
129 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) ("PROTECT Act").
130 The PROTECT Act, while aimed at enhancing prosecutorial power in crimes against
children, has generated significant controversy through the "Feeney Amendment." This little-
debated amendment from a conservative U.S. Representative restricted much of the independ-
ence of the Sentencing Commission, preventing new downward departures from being added to
the Guidelines until 2005. Id. at 669; USSC Report, supra note 86, at 9. See also Bowman,
supra note 143, at 245; Larry Kupers, Proposal for a Viable Federal Sentencing Scheme in the
2005] FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES WEIGHT-LOSS PLAN 1115
unreasonableness of departures,1 3' the PROTECT Act substituted de
novo review of all departures, attempting to eliminate any semblance
of judicial discretion.' 32  This standard required appellate courts to
review "the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts,"
and set aside sentences that it viewed as too high or too low. 133 One
district judge referred to these changes as "the saddest and most coun-
terproductive episode in the evolution of federal sentencing doc-
trine."'134 Justice Scalia may disagree with this assessment, since he
once referred to the Sentencing Commission as a "'junior-varsity'
Congress".
135
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS UNDERLYING BOOKER
The Supreme Court has reexamined both the Guidelines and the
underpinnings of federal sentencing practices numerous times since
the creation of the Sentencing Commission. 136  Several cases in par-
ticular provide the foundation for the Booker decision, though, since
the division between the merits and remedy majorities in that case has
been evident for some time. These cases, and in many situations,
their concurring and dissenting opinions, provide valuable insights on
Wake of Blakely v. Washington, 17 FED. SENTENCING REPORTER 28 (2002); Mark Osler, Uni-
formity and Traditional Sentencing Goals in the Age of Feeney, 16 FED. SENTENCING
REPORTER 253 (2004).
131 USSC Report, supra note 86, at 7.
132 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting); USSC Report, supra note 86, at 9.
As amended by the PROTECT Act, if the guidelines sentence did "not advance the objectives
set forth in 3553(a)(2); or is not authorized under 3553(b)" or if "the sentence departs to an
unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, the court of appeals shall review de
novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 117 Stat. 650, 670(2003).
133 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003).
134 Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist With Their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENTENCING REPORTER
20 (2004).
135 Steven G. Kalar. A Blakely Primer: An End to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?
CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 10,13; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 See, e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that state's manda-
tory minimum sentences did not implicate the jury trial requirement; Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389 (1995) (judicial finding used to increase sentence was not barred from subsequent
prosecution by Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1995) (allowing
sentencing judge to use the preponderance standard); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193
(1992) (SRA provisions for limited appellate review did not change traditional deference to trial
court discretion); United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that judicial finding that
defendant brandished weapon did not violate Apprendi); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002) (failure to charge drug quantity in indictment did not constitute plain error under Ap-
prendi rule); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (treating recidivism as a
sentencing factor and not an element of a crime did not violate constitutional rights); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (reversing Williams, holding that carjacking statute's higher
minimum sentences when violence factors were considered were elements, not sentencing
factors).
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the Booker result and just how it may apply to the expected deluge of
appeals in its wake.
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey
Apprendi v. New Jersey137 has become the Supreme Court's foun-
dational statement on the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement,
giving rise to the rule that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact ... that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'
138
In Apprendi, the Court invalidated New Jersey's hate crime statute,
which had allowed trial judges to extend sentences if they found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the offender had acted with racial
animus. 139 The defendant Apprendi had run afoul of this provision
when he fired his gun into the home of an African-American family
that had moved into a formerly all-white neighborhood.' n While
Apprendi pled guilty to weapons offenses, the hate crime was not
charged and only surfaced upon at his sentencing hearing; once the
judge applied this statute, Apprendi's sentence doubled from the
maximum that would have been supported by his pleas. 141
The Court declared that the invalid statute clearly ran afoul of
common law principles regarding the jury trial, since a jury trial re-
quired that "the truth of every accusation .. .should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's]
equals and neighbours .... ,,142 This history underscored how the in-
valid statute managed to "[remove] the jury from the determination of
a fact that, if found, [exposed] the criminal defendant to a penalty
exceeding the maximum" justified by the jury verdict on its own. 14 3
Disapproving of this lower evidentiary standard, the Court de-
scribed such judicial factfinding as little more than "a tail which wags
the dog of the substantive offense."'144 But the Apprendi majority was
not ready to completely remove judicial discretion from the sentenc-
137 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
38 Id. at 477.
13 9 Id. at 496-97.
140 Id. at 469
14 Id. at 470, 474. Specifically, Apprendi was charged with 23 offenses and pled guilty to
two counts of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of unlawful pos-
session of an antipersonnel bomb. Id. at 469-70.
I
42 Id. at 466, 477, 478, 482-83.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 495 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).
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ing calculus, as it allowed judges to use discretion as long as they
"impos[ed] a judgment within the range prescribed by statute."' 145
Justice Breyer dissented, fearing that requiring every sentencing
fact to be submitted to the jury would undermine the justice system.
Such a requirement "could easily place the defendant in the awkward
(and conceivably unfair) position of having to deny he committed the
crime yet offer proof about how he committed it, e.g., 'I did not sell
drugs, but I sold no more than 500 grams." 146 Justice Scalia coun-
tered this view by maintaining that "the criminal will never get more
punishment than he bargained for. . . ." when his guilt is "determined
beyond a reasonable doubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of his fellow
citizens." 1
47
Justice O'Connor has consistently maintained that the Court has
wrongly decided this line of cases. She observed in dissent that Ap-
prendi "halt[ed] the current debate on sentencing reform in its tracks
and [] invalidate[ed] with the stroke of a pen three decades' worth of
nationwide reform.... O'Connor warned that "[lt]he Court throws
... caution to the wind and, in the process, threatens to cast sentenc-
ing in the United States into what will likely prove to be a lengthy
period of considerable confusion.149 In fact, in only two years over
1,800 Apprendi challenges to sentences and convictions had reached
the Circuit Courts of Appeals*1 50 O'Connor saw these statistics as the
"tip of the iceberg,"'151 and a similar fear has pervaded Booker.
B. Blakely v. Washington
Blakely v. Washington152 set off a wave of panic among lower
courts and academics who fretted that the similarly worded Federal
Guidelines would soon be struck in the manner of Washington state's.
In Blakely, the defendant had pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged
145 Id. at 481.
146 Id. at 496 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
147 Id. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). At Fanfan's sentencing hearing, the judge restated,
I quote [from the majority opinion of Blakely], "The Framers would not have thought
it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty,
the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to 'the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,' rather than a lone em-
ployee" that's me, the Judge, "of the State." End of quote.
United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 at *3 (D. Me. 2004). In case the reader is concerned
that Scalia has personal issues with Breyer, he once assured us, "I am, as always, pleased to
travel in Justice Breyer's company .. " Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
'
48Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Ring, 536 U.S. at 619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
152 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
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wife, but the trial judge found that he acted with "deliberate cruelty"
and made a substantial upward departure. 153 The Court applied the
Apprendi rule since the upward was clearly grounded on facts not
submitted to a jury. Writing for the same majority as Apprendi, Jus-
tice Scalia stated that the Apprendi maximum sentence was what "a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.... 154 A sentence based on
anything in excess of the jury's verdict exceeded proper judicial au-
thority in the Court's view.'
55
Justice O'Connor in dissent correctly predicted that the Court
would extend Blakely to the Federal Guidelines. She argued that the
two systems were functionally the same, "for as residents of 'Ap-
prendi-land' are fond of saying, 'the relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect. ' "1 56  O'Connor's position, like Breyer's in Ap-
prendi, was that for instances such as defendants who obstruct justice
during trial, it is simply impossible for these facts to be submitted to
the same jury that tries the charged offense. 15 7
Justice Breyer identified a continuous reluctance among the Ap-
prendi-Blakely majority to acknowledge plea bargaining as an essen-
tial part of the sentencing system.158  Justice Scalia dismissed this
proposal, though, arguing that "the Sixth Amendment was not written
for the benefit of those who choose to forgo its protection. It guaran-
tees the right to jury trial. It does not guarantee that a particular num-
ber of jury trials will actually take place.' 59
IV. FEDERAL SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER: How MUCH WEIGHT
HAVE THE GUIDELINES LOST?
The response to Booker has been rapid at the Circuit and District
Court levels. 160  In the first month following the Supreme Court's
153 Id. at 2534. Under the jury verdict, Blakely would have been subject to a 53 month
maximum, but the departure resulted in a 90 month sentence. Note that deliberate cruelty is one
of the drafters' suggested departure justifications under Part V Fed Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. Appx.
§5K2 (2005).
15 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
1
5 5 Id.
15 6 1d. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor, of course, means that Scalia is a
proud resident of Apprendi-land. Query how this compares to Wonderland, which Scalia some-
what eagerly implies as Breyer's residence.
157 Id. at 2546.
'
58Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 2542.
160 Many sentences were postponed in the wake of Blakely, and the resolution of these
cases is rapidly emerging following Booker. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Transforms
Use of Sentence Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A4. The Author notes that by the
time this Comment has made its way through the process of journal publication, some of the
lower court decisions discussed in Part IV may be reversed or vacated.
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decision, a number of District Courts and every Circuit Court except
for the Fifth Circuit have addressed Booker in a sentencing decision.
Clear divisions are already evident: some courts are seeing the Booker
remedy as freeing them to take other sentencing issues into considera-
tion, while others believe they are bound to the Guidelines in all must
the most extreme exceptions. There is not always consensus within
courts, either; for instance, different judges in the Nebraska District
Court have already issued conflicting opinions interpreting Booker.
This Comment advocates that the less restrictive position is prefer-
able, since while the Guidelines are still an important sentencing con-
sideration, they are not a magic machine into which judges feed sen-
tencing factors and are given a perfectly tailored sentence.161
The volume of future cases affected is heavy enough to create con-
cerns, as government estimates claim that approximately 1,200 fed-
eral defendants are sentenced every week. 162
A. Giving the Guidelines Less Prominence
The Second Circuit has made the most compelling case to date for
treating the Guidelines as just one of a number of sentencing factors
to consider. In United States v. Crosby, the Second Circuit explained
that it hoped its "explanation will be helpful to bench and bar
alike."'163 The court argued that "sentencing judges remain under a
duty with respect to the Guidelines - not the previously imposed duty
to apply the Guidelines, but the continuing duty to 'consider' them,
along with the other factors listed in § 3553(a)." 164 Since the trial
judge would still need to calculate a Guidelines range before deter-
mining a sentence, he would be "entitled to find all of the facts that
the Guidelines make relevant to the determination of a Guidelines
sentence and all of the facts relevant to the determination of a non-
Guidelines sentence."'
' 65
Crosby proposed five principles to guide judges in applying
Booker, noting that "[t]he Guidelines are no longer mandatory."'' 66
The trial judge must consider § 3553(a)'s sentencing objectives as
161 Nor should one consider the Sentencing Guidelines as the Shmoo that would solve the
problems of the federal criminal courts. See Capp Enterprises, Inc., Shmoo, at http://www.lil-
abner.com/shmoo.html (last visited on Mar. 20, 2005) (on file with the Case Western Reserve
Law Review), for more information on the "lovable ... selfless," and ever-popular Shmoo.
162 Michael McGough, Court Seems Unreceptive to Federal Sentence Guides, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAzETrE, Oct. 5, 2004, at A4.
163 397 F.3d 103,107 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2005).
161Id. at I11.
165 1d. at 112.
1661d. at 113.
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well as the Guidelines. 167 Applying the Guidelines requires determin-
ing "the applicable Guidelines range" and considering the Guidelines'
underlying policies. 168  The sentencing judge then should decide
whether or not to impose the resulting Guidelines sentence. 69 Most
importantly, "the sentencing judge is entitled to find all the facts ap-
propriate for determining either a Guidelines sentence or a non-
Guidelines sentence."'170
The Second Circuit soon explained that the rationale for delegating
such fact finding discretion to the district judges was for appellate
courts to "exhibit restraint, not micromanagement."' 71 The Second
Circuit believed that district judges were more familiar with the trial
record than appellate judges. 172 Giving significant discretion to the
trial courts, the Second Circuit indicated that it would uphold the
lower court's decision as long as the trial record showed awareness of
the applicable Guidelines range and underlying statutory factors.
173
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this proposal, explaining that
such a system would place the impetus for reviewing errors with the
District Courts which were the very source of the error; in other
words, these courts would be "resentencing in order to determine
whether resentencing is required."
174
The Eastern Wisconsin District was the first court at the district
level to take up the less restrictive reading of Booker.175 Challenging
the view that the Guidelines should remain the centerpiece of the sen-
tencing framework, the court proposed that when "a defendant's his-
tory and character are positive, consideration of all the § 3553(a) fac-
tors might call for a sentence outside the guideline range." 176 While
cautioning against a return to indeterminate sentencing, the judge
reasoned that "courts are free to disagree [with the Guidelines range]
so long as the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully supported
by reasons tied to the § 3553(a) factors.' 7 7 Further, "[d]istrict courts
cannot just add up figures and pick a number within a narrow range.
Rather, they must.., sentence the person before them as an individ-
ual. Booker is not an invitation to do business as usual.' 78 The East-
16 7 Id
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
'71 United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2005).
172 Id.
173 Id.
'74 United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11 th Cir. 2005).
'75 United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
1
7 6 Id. at 986.
'77 Id. at 987.
178 Id.
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em District of Virginia urged a similar approach, viewing sentencing
not as "a mere arithmetical exercise" but as a balance between the
Guidelines and section 3553(a)'s five goals of "respect for the law,"
"just punishment," "adequate deterrence," "protecting the public,"
and rehabilitating the defendant.
The District Court for Southern Iowa soon followed this analy-
sis.179 That court reasoned that if the Guidelines were "presumptive,"
they would "[cause] an imbalance in the application of the statute to a
particular defendant... making the Guidelines, in effect, still manda-
tory." 1 80 However, "[w]hile a greater degree of discretion has been
returned to district courts post-Booker, that discretion is not unfet-
tered or, perhaps a better word, unmoored."' 8' The Southern District
of New York also followed this advisory route, finding nothing in
Booker that prevented judges from considering "facts not typically
found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant at plea allocution" to
determine an individualized sentence for the defendant.
82
B. Retaining the Guidelines with Central Importance
The Sixth Circuit is the only appellate court so far to have taken
the position that its district courts are still required to apply the
Guidelines much as they existed before Booker and has been very
restrictive in what it will allow trial judges to consider.' 83 Most of the
decisions taking the more restrictive approach to the Guidelines have
actually come at the district level, particularly from the Utah District
Court. Notorious for holding the federal Guidelines unconstitutional
shortly after Blakely,184 Judge Cassell of that district has already in-
terpreted Booker several times to allow Guidelines departures only in
unusual circumstances.
85
For instance, in United States v. Duran,'86 the Utah District turned
to semantics while holding that the Guidelines were advisory for a
defendant subject to the safety valve drug sentencing provisions. The
judge reasoned that "[s]o long as the court consults the Guidelines in
179 United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
80°Id. at 1028.
11 d. at 1027.
182United States v. West, No. 03 CR. 508(RWS), 2005 WL 180930 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27,
2005) (slip opinion).
183 United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005).
184 United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. Utah 2004).
185 Interestingly enough, Judge Cassell clerked for Justice Scalia on the D.C. Circuit fol-
lowing law school. See Paul G. Cassell, Rgsumj, at
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/judges/cassell.html. (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (on file with the
Case Western Reserve Law Review). It is not yet clear whether Judge Cassell has applied for
residency in Apprendi-land. See supra note 76.
186No. 2:04-CR-00396PGC (D. Utah Jan. 31, 2005) (slip opinion).
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determining an appropriate sentence, any resulting sentence is 'pursu-
ant to' the Guidelines. Such a sentence would be 'in compliance
with' or 'authorized by' the Guidelines, as Black's Law Dictionary
defines 'pursuant to."" 87 Continuing down this path in United States
v. Wilson, 88 Judge Cassell maintained that the Guidelines were the
best indicia of societal expectations for sentencing because "Booker
held that while the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the rest of the
Sentencing Reform Act is.',
189
The Utah District thus gave "heavy weight" to the Guidelines, de-
parting only in "unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive
reasons."' 90  After criticism from numerous other courts,' 91 Judge
Cassell reaffirmed his position in a memorandum to Wilson.' 92 The
judge insisted that "[h]eavy reliance on the Guidelines is ... the only
way to implement the congressional directive for courts to avoid 'un-
warranted sentencing disparities ... . The judge defended his
decision, arguing that Congress had not rejected restrictions on con-
sidering individual characteristics of the offender, but had moved in
the opposite direction. 94
Other courts have joined the Utah District in the call to give the
Guidelines heavy weight. Contradicting the rest of his district, one of
Nebraska's District judges took such a stance. 95 That judge recast
the debate as "not whether the Guidelines are advisory, but rather
whether judges should, in the exercise of their newly minted discre-
tion, normally follow the Guidelines ... because that approach repre-
sents the best (though an imperfect) method of sentencing."'' 96 En-
dorsing limited Guidelines departures, that judge also argued that to
disregard the Guidelines "is to thumb our judicial noses at Con-
gress. ' ' 9
187 1d. at 4.
1s8 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
189Id. at 913.
190 Id. at 925.
191 See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005), United States
v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
192 United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp.2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005).
1
9 3 Id. at 1271.
94id. at 1275.
95 United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Neb. 2005). Cf United States v.
Kelley, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (D. Neb. 2005); United States v. Huerta-Rodriguez, 355 F. Supp.
2d 1019 (D. Neb. 2005). Noting that his colleagues in the Nebraska District took the less re-
strictive reading of Booker, Judge Kopf offered, "[i]f I turn out to be wrong, I will buy them all
a beer." Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
196 Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
197 Id. at 1061.
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The North Dakota District Court turned to the testimony of the
Sentencing Commission to justify joining this side of the debate. 198
That court argued that since the Sentencing Commission "firmly be-
lieves that sentencing courts should give substantial weight to
the . . . Guidelines . . . Booker should be read as requiring such
weight."' 99 The basis for this argument was the Sentencing Commis-
sion's claim that data in the three weeks of sentencing following
Booker showed that sentencing was consistent with pre-Booker be-
havior by trial courts.2°°
CONCLUSION
While Booker may have made the Guidelines advisory, they sur-
vive with as much vigor as Judge Easterbrook's wounded opera
star.2°1 As for just how much weight to accord the Guidelines, the
most logical application is to apply them as one of a number of sen-
tencing factors. While the Guidelines do serve a valuable function in
providing judges with a starting point for rational sentencing analysis,
the Sentencing Commission's own statistics show that they are far
from a perfect system. When considering that numerous sentencing
disparities pervade today despite the Guidelines' nearly two-decade
effort to eradicate them, surely it is worth seizing the opportunity to
correct some of these inequities through more individualized sentenc-
ing assessment.
Taking the approach that the Guidelines should be given heavy
weight and departures should only be made in limited circumstances
turns a blind eye not only to the still valid considerations identified in
the Federal Sentencing Act but ignores the practical environment in
which the federal criminal courts operate. Rather than maintaining a
system which has grown overweight with hundreds of amendments
and additions, courts should view Booker as an opportunity to employ
the Guidelines in a flexible way, considering the significance of the
efforts that support these rules but not hesitating to depart from the
suggested sentencing ranges in reasonable circumstances. Until Con-
gress inevitably responds to Booker, sentencing courts cannot sit idly
by; they must continue to promote the societal goals of the remaining
sentencing scheme, as evidenced by section 3553(a). The best way to
accomplish that is simply to weigh the post-Booker guidelines equally
against these other sentencing objectives.
198 United States v. Peach, 3 F Supp. 2d 118 (D.N.D. 2005).
199 Id. at 1020-21 (citation, internal quotations, and court's emphasis omitted).
2001d. at 1021.
201 See Booker, 375 F.3d at 516 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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